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Abstract 
This paper provides new and unexplored evidence of a negative link between an increasing female 
participation in politics and the infiltration of organized crime in government. We perform an 
empirical analysis of about 1,700 Southern Italian municipalities between 1985 and 2013 exploiting 
two Italian laws: law no. 164/1991, which allows measure of mafia infiltration in the Italian 
municipalities, and law no. 81/1993, which creates an exogenous source of variation in the share of 
women on the council that allows for correction of endogeneity bias. Increasing the female proportion 
on the city council of 10 percentage points reduces the probability of dissolution for mafia infiltration 
of about 1.8 p.p.; the result is confirmed when considering a female mayor. This negative effect 
remains across several robustness checks. This research adds a further reason in favour of the 
reduction of the gender gap in politics. In fact, policies aimed at legitimizing democracy, such as 
gender quotas in electoral law, also have the effect of strengthening institutions in the fight against 
organized crime, which is always a key government agenda. 
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1. Introduction 
Arguments in favour of an increasing female participation in politics address the legitimation of 
democracy and the adoption of practices that improve the quality of institutions (Epstein et al., 2005). 
Although the number has increased over the past 20 years, women are still underrepresented in several 
contexts, especially in government.1 Academic research on the gender gap in politics has investigated 
the effect of policy measures aimed at encouraging female presence in politics. The rationale of those 
policies relies on the notion that stimulating a more equal representation of women in government 
leads to a gain in performance and quality of government, because men and women tend to perform 
differently in similar contexts. Nevertheless, no conclusive evidence describes whether women’s 
behaviour is better than men’s one in policy setting. 
Relying on a quasi-experiment, we contribute to this debate by providing evidence of a further 
argument in favour of a greater representation of women in political institutions, related to organized-
crime infiltration in politics. To the best of our knowledge, this issue has not yet been investigated in 
the gender literature. Political economy literature referred to sociological and psychological 
characteristics of women to justify that they tend to be less corrupt than men and to promote more 
honest government (Swamy et al., 2001; Dollar et al., 2001). The several studies that follow 
underlined that women, as the “fairer sex”, have a ‘higher moral nature and propensity to bring their 
finer moral sensibilities on public life, and particularly on the conduct of politics’ (Goetz, 2007); 
moreover, they are less likely to sacrifice the common good for personal (material) gain. This role of 
women in government may be particularly relevant because one of the most significant difficulties 
faced by governors is the design of institutions that discourage their agents from acting 
opportunistically, at the expense of the public interest. Thus, increasing direct female participation in 
government could help mitigate the lack of responsiveness of governments and enhance the quality 
of institutions and organizations (Staudt, 1998). 
One of the consequences of stronger institutions can be deterrence toward all the form of crime and, 
in particular, toward organized crime that, in different ways, tries to infiltrate politics. Indeed, 
although criminal organizations are usually involved in a wide range of illegal activities in the 
economy (e.g., supplying illicit goods and services, extorting individuals or firms, and in some cases, 
offering private security) they also try to influence politics. Organized crime, through violence (in 
rare cases), threats, and, above all, corruption, tries to infiltrate political bodies; the infiltration 
                                                      
1At the beginning of 2019, approximately one fourth of the members of lower or single houses of parliament were women. 
At the end of 2018, women’s membership in parliaments rose to 24%, representing an increase of 13% with respect to 
the past two decades. In 2018, the number of women presiding over houses of national parliaments was almost 20%; 
similarly, only 18% of appointed ministers are women, and they are usually assigned portfolios related to environment, 
natural resources, and energy, followed by social sectors. This means women are still largely excluded from the executive 
branches of government (European Parliamentary Research Service). 
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consists of constraining and influencing the choices of civil servants to oversee management of city 
life in public procurements, public works, urban plants, housing, etc. The result is a huge economic 
gain for criminal organizations and a loss for society. Thus, on one hand, policies aimed at reducing 
the underrepresentation of women in politics, beyond equality reasons, lead to institutional 
improvements. On the other hand, stronger institutions discourage the proliferation of crime 
(Buonanno et al., 2015). Literature has not yet investigated the effect of lowering the gender gap in 
politics on organized crime involvement in government; our paper fills this gap by addressing whether 
a greater share of women in political bodies may prevent the influence exercised by criminal 
organizations on politicians. Because women have higher standards of ethical behaviour and are more 
concerned with the common good, they may be naturally less tolerant of all the forms of violation or 
alteration of morality, like corruption (as well documented) and, in particular, crime (as we assert). 
We perform an empirical analysis on the effect of an increase in the fraction of women in political 
offices on the probability of mafia infiltration. We focus on southern Italian municipalities where 
criminal organization has been traditionally concentrated. We exploit law no. 164/1991 that 
prescribes the dissolution of the local government due to mafia infiltration, to capture the presence of 
organized crime in political institutions. This law states that to dissolve a municipality, the 
“Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia” must ascertain, above all, the direct or indirect links of local 
administrators with organized crime or, alternatively, the conditioning that the mafia imposes on 
administrators. We estimate linear probability model (LPM) and probit models, where the binary 
dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the municipality has been dissolved and 0 otherwise 
(according to different operationalizations) and the regressor of interest is the share of women on 
political city councils. To resolve the potential endogeneity problem in the relationship of interest, 
we exploit law no. 81/1993, introducing gender quotas in local electoral law, as a quasi-experiment. 
The reform constitutes an exogenous source of variation in the share of women in a municipal body. 
Thus, we instrument the share of women with a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for 
municipalities affected by the gender quota law and 0 otherwise; this instrument has predictive power 
for women’s presence in municipal political bodies but does not directly affect mafia infiltration. 
The panel data analysis of about 1,700 Italian southern municipalities from 1985 to 2013 finds that 
an increase in the share of woman in a municipal body decreases its probability of dissolution due to 
mafia infiltration. The average marginal effect (AME) shows that an increase in the female 
participation in a council of 10 percentage points, decreases the probability of dissolution for mafia 
infiltration by about 1.8 p.p. These findings are robust to different operationalizations of the binary 
dependent variable. Moreover, we address the idea that women as leaders may enhance institutions 
by promoting more effective measures to deter crime infiltration. Accordingly, we test if a female 
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mayor affects the probability of interest. Analogous to previous results, the probability of municipal 
dissolution decreases by about 5 p.p. if the mayor is female rather than male. Findings are robust to 
the sample restriction to more homogeneous units and to different thresholds of populations, 
according to appropriate criteria. As in several recent contributions on related topics, we focus on the 
local (micro) level to exploit the similarity of institutional settings to strengthen identification issues. 
Results provide additional reasoning against the underrepresentation of women in politics. Therefore, 
policies targeted to the empowerment of women in government may have the further effect of 
deterring mafia infiltration in public organizations. A key related issue concerns the efficacy of 
policies such as gender quota laws. De Paola et al. (2010) and Baltrunaite et al. (2014) demonstrated, 
in the same scenario of Italian municipalities, that gender quota increased the female share on city 
councils and improved the quality of elected politicians. We tried to evaluate the effect of the gender 
quota law. Indeed, according to the estimates of the increase in the share of women in municipal 
bodies due to the gender quota law made by De Paola et al (2010) (almost 2 p.p.), our results predict 
a decrease in the probability of dissolution of about 6 p.p.; this decrease in probability of dissolution 
reaches almost 26 p.p. if we consider the estimated growth in the number of female mayor (3.1 p.p.). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 
describes the Italian institutional framework, variables, and data. Sections 4 and 5 present the 
empirical strategy and results, respectively. Section 6 discusses the issues related to results and 
performs some robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
The underrepresentation of women is especially evident in political institutions. The causes lie in a 
number of reasons: the higher entry cost for participating in political life, the violation of the 
traditional role of women, the choice made by political parties not to nominate women because voters 
may dislike female participation in politics, etc. In addition to ethical and equality reasons as 
rationales to reduce the gender gap, the debate on whether gender matters in policymaking is still 
open and evidence is mixed. On one hand, reducing the underrepresentation of women in government, 
achieving ethical or social justice goals, contributes to legitimate democracy (Stevens, 2007); 
moreover, recent works have shown that it may also impact performance and governmental quality. 
Specifically, women are geared toward certain kinds of public spending (Rigon and Tanzi, 2011); 
they are more likely to implement policies such as childcare, water provision, health, and 
environmental sustainability (Clots-Figueras, 2011; Funk and Gathmann, 2015; Rehavi, 2007); they 
increase electoral participation (De Paola et al., 2014) and the quality of elected politicians 
(Baltrunaite et al., 2014); being more liberal than men, female legislators are more likely to support 
women’s issues (Swers, 1998; Washington, 2008). In contrast, when women run local administrations, 
5 
 
those systems tend to be less stable (Gagliarducci and Paserman, 2012); actions enhancing a more 
equal participation of sexes could, instead, promote less qualified individuals at the expense of 
performance and efficiency (Holzer and Neumark, 2000). A mayor’s gender is uncorrelated with local 
government size and with the composition of municipal spending (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014). 
In this paper we are interested in a particular effect of the underrepresentation of women in politics 
that concerns the proliferation of crime. Politicians are one of the targets of organized crime in several 
countries. In recent years, the study of organized crime has become an important research topic among 
social scientists in discerning its origins linked to the distribution of natural resources and to the 
weakness of institutions (Dimico et al., 2012; Konrad and Skaperdas, 2012; Buonanno et al., 2015), 
its destructive effect on physical and human capital (Pinotti, 2015), and its effect on politicians’ 
quality (Daniele and Geys, 2015). Dal Bó and Di Tella (2003) and Dal Bó et al. (2006, 2007) showed 
that once elections have taken place and the winner takes office, criminal organizations influence 
policymaking by “inducing a given policy maker to change his action from that preferred by society 
to that preferred by the criminal groups” (Dal Bó and Di Tella, 2003). Kugler et al., (2005) showed 
that criminal organizations with sufficient economic and military power may affect policies by 
bribing or intimidating politicians in office. The empirical evidence has confirmed that the influence 
of organized crime on politics (Acemoglu et al., 2013) increases immediately after elections (Daniele 
and Dipoppa, 2017). Moreover, criminal organizations may distort the political selection process by 
inducing the election of less able politicians (Daniele, 2017). 
The relationship between the presence of women in political organizations and crime has been 
analysed referring to corruption (as a form of criminality) in two leading papers by Dollar et al. (2001) 
and Swamy et al. (2001). In cross country analysis, they find a negative correlation between women’s 
presence in parliament and corruption. Very recently, a paper by Jha and Sarangi (2018) first 
addressed the question of causality, providing robust evidence that women’s presence in parliaments 
have a causal negative impact on corruption. We contribute to this field of literature, averring that 
more women in politics, promoting loyal and honest behaviours in governments, could constrain 
criminal organizations from infiltrating. This argument provides further motivation in favour of the 
adoption of policy measures aimed at increasing the presence of women in politics. 
3. Institutional Framework, Variables and Data 
To examine the impact of women’s participation in politics on the scale of mafia infiltration in 
government, we focus on Italian municipalities in Calabria, Campania, Puglia, and Sicilia, the 
southern Italian regions where organized crime (in the form of, respectively, ’ndrangheta, camorra, 
sacra corona unita, and mafia) has traditionally been concentrated. Restricting the sample to the south 
of Italy allows us to work with sufficiently similar municipalities, in terms of unobserved 
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characteristics (e.g. political culture and social capital) that can affect estimations. We construct a 
data set including yearly observations for about 1,700 Italian municipalities over the period 1985–
2013. 
To capture organized crime infiltration in Italian municipalities, we consider local government 
dissolutions due to mafia infiltration (see, among others, Acconcia et al., 2014; Daniele and Geys, 
2015). In 1991, the Italian national government, in a period of intense mafia-related killings, imposed 
an emergency measure. Law no. 164/1991 states that the national government can decree the 
dissolution of municipal administration “when evidence emerges regarding direct or indirect links 
between members of the local government and criminal organisations [. . . ] jeopardising the free 
will of the electoral body and the sound functioning of the municipal administration”.2 In particular, 
the dissolution of an administration is proposed by a parliamentary commission in the Ministry of 
Interior (“Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia”) to the President of the Republic, who issues the 
official decree of municipal dissolution after approval of the government cabinet. Upon the removal 
of a city council, three external commissioners are assigned to govern the administration during the 
next 12–18 months, possibly extended to 24. Then, a new local government is elected.3 Figure 1 
shows the number of municipal dissolutions for (suspected) mafia infiltration per year in the 
timeframe 1991–2013. Figure 2 illustrates the number of municipal dissolutions from 1991 to 2013, 
divided by the four regions.4 
Figure 1: Municipal dissolution for suspected mafia infiltration. 1991–2013. 
 
Notes: on the vertical axis there is the number municipal dissolution. Our elaboration. 
 
Between 1991 and 2013, 216 local governments were dismissed because of (suspected) mafia 
infiltration.5 Their greatest number is in Campania; Sicilia and Calabria show almost the same number 
of dissolutions and Puglia counts just 7 dissolutions. As suggested by Pinotti (2015), the relatively 
                                                      
2
 http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/1991/07/25/091A3362/sg 
3
 Data referring to the municipal dissolution for mafia infiltration according to law no. 164/1991 are publicly available 
on the Italian Parliament’s “Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia” website. 
http://www.camera.it/_bicamerali/leg15/commbicantimafia/documentazionetematica/23/schedabase.asp.  
4
 Note that, during the considered time span, only seven municipalities were dissolved in the rest of the Italy outside the 
examined regions. 
5
 Among these, 40 municipalities were dissolved more than once. 
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low number of municipal dissolutions in Puglia is justified by the notion that, although in Sicilia, 
Calabria and Campania criminal organizations date back more than 150 years, in Puglia criminal 
activities began around 1970. 
Figure 2: Municipal dissolution for suspected mafia infiltration by region. 1991–2013 
 
Notes: on the vertical axis there is the number municipal dissolution. Our elaboration. 
 
The variable representing municipal dissolution (the dependent variable in the empirical analysis) is 
a dummy taking value of 1 if the municipality has dissolved and 0 otherwise. To assess the robustness 
of our results, we experiment with a number of different implementations of the dependent variable. 
The regressor of interest is the share of women in the municipal political body. The political structure 
of a municipality comprises three bodies: the municipal council, the mayor, and the municipal 
executive. The municipal council issues municipal laws and is elected (along with the mayor6) by 
citizens every five years7 and its size is statutory according to municipalities’ population size. The 
mayor is a member of the municipal council responsible for governance of the administration and to 
maintain public order, civil defence, electoral and registry offices, and other duties delegated by a 
higher order political body; moreover, the mayor issues decrees and ordinances. The municipal 
executive council is selected by the mayor and cooperates in municipal management; the municipal 
executive has a residual role in carrying out all the tasks not directly attributed by law to the municipal 
council or mayor. The municipal executive is smaller than the municipal council and its size is 
decided by the mayor with a statutory maximum number. 
To compute the share of women in a municipality, we divide the number of women in these three 
bodies by the sum of all members, considering relevant for our analysis the full political body of 
municipalities. Indeed, law no. 164/1991 states that a municipality can be dissolved because of 
emerging evidence regarding direct or indirect links between local administration and criminal 
organizations. According to Decree 267/2000 (Art. 77), local administrators are the mayor, municipal 
council members (“consiglieri”), and aldermans (“assessori” – municipal executive members). 
                                                      
6
 Before 1993 the Mayor was elected by the members of municipal council. 
7
 The term was shortened to four years between 1993 and 2000 (L 25/3/1993, no.81, art.2; DLgs 18/8/2000, no.267, 
art.51). 
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The Italian Ministry of Interior provides data on local administrators.8 In particular, information on 
every local election from 1985 to 2017 is publicly available on the website. For every municipality, 
the website provides information about year of elections, size of the municipal council and executive, 
name, age, gender, role in the administration, political party, job, and education level of each member 
of the administration. 
In the time span of this analysis, a relevant institutional change in municipal elections occurred: the 
introduction of the gender quota with law no. 81/1993. The reform prescribed, first, inter alia, the 
election of the mayor by universal suffrage; then, it established (art.5, subsequently modified by L 
15/10/1993, no. 415, art. 2) that, for municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants, no more than 
2/3 of the candidates on an electoral list could be of the same sex, whereas for municipalities with 
less than 15,000 inhabitants, the threshold was fixed at 3/4. The main reason for the introduction of 
the gender quota law was to overcome unequal political participation. Hence, the provision of the law 
was aimed at promoting gender equality in politics and, to let the voter choose freely, the quotas 
related only to participation in the electoral lists and did not ensure women would be elected 
(Parliamentary Debate – “Discussione Parlamentare” – n° 33724). 9  In September 1995, the 
Constitutional Court (Sentence no. 422) declared the gender quota unconstitutional because 
prejudicial to art. 3 and art. 51 of the Italian Constitution that enshrine the fundamental principle of 
equal access to elective offices; hence, no preferential treatment could be performed on the basis of 
sex.10 Therefore, the law was only enforced during municipal elections between March 25, 1993 and 
September 12, 1995. 11  In the four regions of interest, 85% of municipalities voted during the 
enforcement of the gender quotas law. 
Figure 3 shows the mean, across municipalities, of the share of women in the political body for 
municipalities affected/unaffected by the gender quota law, from 1985 to 2013. We identify the first 
as the treatment group and the others as the control group. Until 1992, the two lines overlap; then, in 
1993, the share of woman in the treatment group sharply increases. In line with the findings of De 
Paola et al., (2010), even if in force only for two years, the effects of the gender-quota legislation 
persisted after the abrogation of the law and municipalities unaffected by the gender quota law 
experienced a continuously growth in the share of women. 
 
                                                      
8
 https://dait.interno.gov.it/elezioni/open-data?f%5B0%5D=node%253Afield_argomento%3A180.  
9
  https://storia.camera.it/lavori/sedute/4-dicembre-1992-s11-33724. 
10
 All other provisions of law no. 81/1993 were unaffected by the Judgement of Constitutional Court. 
11
 A potential mixing between the two groups of municipalities may emerge. Some municipalities preparing electoral lists 
before the period when the gender quota was in place, voted with the gender quota; some municipalities that had prepared 
electoral lists during the period when the gender quota was in force voted after its abolition. However, considering that 
electoral campaigns officially last for 30 days, we have no such mixing in our sample because no municipalities voted 
during the 30 days after March 25, 1993 and in the 30 days after September 12, 1995. 
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Figure 3: Mean, across municipalities, of the share of women in the political body for municipalities affected/unaffected 
by the gender quota law. 1985–2013 
 
Notes: on the vertical axis there is the mean (over municipalities) of the share of women in political body from 1985 to 2013. Red line: municipalities 
affected by the gender quota law; green line: municipalities unaffected by the gender quota law. Our elaboration. 
 
Table 1.1 shows the results of mean difference tests in changes in the share of women between the 
treatment group and the control group of municipalities. Difference is a measure of variation in the 
share of female presence on city councils, driven by the gender quota law, that is the mean difference 
test by comparing the share of women’s variations across the two groups. 
Table 1.1: Share of women. Mean difference test 
 All municipalities 
(1) 
Dissolved municipalities 
(2) 
Undissolved municipalities 
(3) 
Difference 0.022*** 
(0.000) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.024*** 
(0.002) 
Notes: The table reports one-sided mean difference test results for the share of women in municipality changes between the treatment and control 
groups; column 1 shows the test over all municipalities; columns (2) and (3) restrict the sample to dissolved and undissolved municipalities for mafia 
infiltration, respectively. The treatment group consists of municipalities affected by the gender quota reform; the control group consists of the rest of 
the sample. Data are annual from 1993 to 2013 at the municipal level. Standard errors are reported in brackets. * shows significance at the 1% 
significance level. 
 
The mean difference in the share of women in local councils between treatment and control group is 
2.2 p.p.. Interestingly, this difference is stronger in undissolved municipalities than in dissolved ones. 
Regardless of the gender quota reform, table 1.2, column 1, shows the mean difference test relative 
to changes in the share of women between undissolved and dissolved municipalities. The t-test 
confirms that the mean of the share of women in municipalities that have never been dissolved is 
statistically greater than that in dissolved municipalities (at the 1% significance level). 
Table 1.2: Share of women. Mean difference test 
 All Municipalities 
(1) 
Dissolved municipalities 
(2) 
Difference 0.017*** 
(0.000) 
0.022*** 
(0.002) 
Notes: column 1 reports the one-sided mean difference test results for the share of women in municipality changes between undissolved and dissolved 
municipalities. Column 2 shows the mean difference test results for the share of women in municipalities in the years outside the dissolution and in the 
year of dissolution. Data are annual from 1991 (when the municipalities’ dissolution for mafia infiltration starts) to 2013 at the municipal level. Standard 
errors are reported in brackets. *** shows significance at the 1%. 
 
Column 2, instead, considers only dissolved municipalities and shows the mean difference test of the 
change in the share of women in the years outside the dissolution and in the year of dissolution. The 
test reveals that the share of women at a time outside the dissolution is 2.2 p.p. higher than the mean 
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of the share of women in the year of dissolution (at the 1% significance level). Therefore, all these 
tests support intuition about a relationship between women’s presence in political administrations and 
mafia infiltration. We also tested that the mean of the share of women in municipalities dissolved 
more than once is not significantly different from the share of women in municipalities dissolved only 
once. 
For empirical analysis we use a set of variables controlling for municipality characteristics (Daniele 
and Geys, 2015). They are:12 
1) population size (in natural log) to control for the size of municipalities (ln_pop); 
2) municipal unemployment rate in 2001, in natural log (ln_unemployment); 
3) ratio of young to old inhabitants in 2001, calculated as the number of >65 for every 100 
inhabitants under age 15, in natural log (ln_young/old). 
Table 2 below summarizes the descriptive statistics of all the variables. 
Table 2: Variables statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max  Observations 
Women  0.102 0.091  0 0.58  N = 41620 (n=1695; T=25) 
Ln_pop 8.351 1.176 5.11 13.9  N = 42219 (n=1692; T=25) 
Ln_unemployment 3.058 0.374 0.39 3.93  N = 37582 (n=1642; T=22) 
Ln_young/old 4.748 0.447 3.09 6.35  N = 37582 (n=1642; T=22) 
Notes: the statistics are calculated starting from 1989 because of the definition of the the binary dependent variable used for the baseline analisis (see 
below). 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
We analyse the impact of the female share in political bodies in southern Italian municipalities on the 
probability of dissolution for mafia infiltration. As shown in figure 1, dissolution did not take place 
at the same time for each municipality; the panel structure of our dataset allows us to take this into 
account and to consider the possibly unobserved time-specific event. 
The baseline specification follows (with subscript i referring to municipalities and t to time) 
	Pr, = 1,, , =  + , + , +  +  +  +	, 	(1) 
where yi,t is a binary variable taking value 1 for municipalities put under commissioners every year 
from the appointment of the elected administration to the year of dissolution, due to (presumed) mafia 
infiltration, and 0 otherwise (that is, it takes value 1 from 1 to maximum 5 times according to the fact 
that the dissolution occurred respectively at the beginning or at the end of the legislative period of the 
dissolved administration, and 0 otherwise). This is because the law no. 164/1991 prescribes dissolving 
the municipalities if the local administrator in force had direct and indirect links with criminal 
organizations. Wi,t is the share of women in the municipal political body (thereafter Women) of 
municipality i at time t, Xi,t is the set of controls for characteristics of municipality i at time t (listed 
above), δi form a vector of provincial and municipal dummies, δt are year fixed effects; Tδr is a region-
                                                      
12
 The source of those variables is ISTAT. 
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specific time trend (to control for any potential differential temporal developments across regions) 
and εi,t is the idiosyncratic error term. We hypothesize that the effect of female presence on city 
councils is time-invariant. 
It is well known that a precise measure of crime is impossible to obtain. Municipal dissolution 
provides an imperfect measure of mafia infiltration in municipalities because it refers to the detection 
of the phenomenon. In fact, 1) not all local administrations infiltrated by organized crime are detected 
and dissolved; 2) a local administration can be erroneously dissolved for suspected mafia infiltrations 
and the decree of dissolution is not cancelled. Those aspects, luckily, do not affect the identification 
assumption. Indeed, in the first case, these municipalities will be erroneously part of the undissolved 
group determining a bias of the estimated effect of women’s presence in municipalities’ political 
bodies towards zero; in the second case, municipalities erroneously belonging to compulsory 
administration group (the dissolved ones) also contribute to bias estimates towards zero.13 Hence, if 
our findings should confirm that women affect mafia infiltration, they will only represent a lower 
bound of the investigated effect; in fact, excluding any possible mismatch listed above, results using 
a “real” measure of organized crime infiltration should be stronger (see Daniele and Geys, 2015). 
We run a first set of municipality-level regressions using linear probability and probit models. 
Estimating Eq. (1) through LPM and probit can produce biased results because of possible 
endogeneity. Endogeneity issues can appear if some unobservable characteristics at the municipal 
level correlate with both the gender of the appointed members of the political body and the probability 
of dissolution. In addition, results may be biased by the reverse causality issue, because higher/lower 
probability of municipal dissolution could affect voters’ predilection regarding the gender of 
politicians. 
Potential endogeneity is treated by exploiting the introduction, in 1993, of the gender quota reform 
in municipal elections, as a quasi-experiment. The introduction of the gender quota law, as described 
in section 3, creates an exogenous source of variation in the gender composition of the municipal 
political body (between municipalities and over time) that potentially correlates with the gender of 
the elected politicians, but does not correlate with our outcomes of interest.14 Thus, we measure the 
share of women in the municipal political body with the implementation of the gender quota law 
(Braga and Scervini, 2017). Because the effectiveness of the instrument was well documented in a 
previous study (De Paola et al., 2010), we have at least two reasons to believe in the validity of the 
instrument. First, neither in the text of the law nor in parliamentary debates, the introduction of gender 
                                                      
13
 Moreover, no problem arises for dissolved municipalities whose decree of municipal dissolution is cancelled because 
insufficient proofs link criminal groups and municipal administrations: these municipalities have been removed from the 
compulsory administration group and included in the undissolved group. 
14
 The same exogenous event has already been exploited by other scholars (De Paola et al., 2010; Rigon and Tanzi, 2011; 
Gagliarducci and Paserman, 2012; De Paola et al., 2014; Baltrunaite et al., 2014; Braga and Scervini, 2017). 
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quotas was considered a possible tool to affect organized crime infiltration in municipalities. 
Secondly, local elections take place every 5 years15 and municipalities cannot change their scheduled 
time. In specific circumstances, the legislature ends before the natural terms and anticipated elections 
take place; from then on, the elections (always after 5 years) will be mismatched compared to the 
regular year of voting in other municipalities. Therefore, it is hardly possible that a municipality 
adapted the election schedule to vote according (or not) to the gender quotas law. For these reasons, 
we can safely maintain that the instrument is uncorrelated with the dependent variable. Moreover, 
findings by De Paola et al. (2010) and the path depicted in figure 3 confirm that the gender quota law 
affects the share of women over the entire period of analysis. 
We address the endogeneity of the share of women in municipal councils with the control function 
approach, consistent in non-linear models (Rivers and Vuong 1988; Wooldridge 2002). 16  The 
approach consists of a two-stage procedure: in the first stage, potential endogenous variables are 
regressed on all the assumed exogenous explanatory variables and the instrument; in the second stage, 
the predicted residuals are used as an additional regressor in the structural equation with the potential 
endogenous variables. 
In the empirical model, the instrumental variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 for all 
municipalities during the years affected by the gender quota law and 0 otherwise (thereafter GQ).17 
We estimate the following two-stage model: 
, =  + , + , +  +  +  +	,	(2) 
Pr, = 1 =  + , + , +  !" +  +  +  +	, 	(3) 
In the first stage, the endogenous variable, Wi,t is regressed on the instrumental variable, GQi,t and the 
set of regressors Xi,t; in the second stage, the dummy variable yi,t is regressed on the Wi,t, the same set 
of regressors Xi,t, and the predicted residuals (Res). 
5. Results 
First, we show estimation results of LPM and probit models. LPM is easier to use and interpret 
because the coefficient of the regressor of interest directly expresses variation in the probability that 
y = 1 for a given variation in the regressor. However, the LPM is not very useful for predictive 
purposes because the probability can take a value below 0 or above 1. Therefore, the probit model 
correct this non-linearity of the binary variables. Given the definition of the binary dependent variable, 
                                                      
15
 In the time span 1993–1999, the electoral period was shortened to four years.  
16
 This approach allows us to consider endogeneity in panel data probit estimations. 
17
 For municipalities that never voted for their council under gender quota law, the GQ takes the value of 0 for the entire 
period; for municipalities in which the council were elected under gender quotas, the GQ takes a value of 1 in that election 
and 0 for previous and following elections. 
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the estimation period starts in 1989 (because before 1989 the value of the binary dependent variable 
is 0 for all municipalities) and ends in 2013. Results appear in table 3. 
The first four columns of table 3 show the results of LPM, whereas the last four show probit 
estimations. For both estimation techniques, columns (1) and (5) report estimates of Eq. (1) without 
considering control variables, region specific time trend, and year fixed effect (FE); columns (2) and 
(6) include year FE; columns (3) and (7) add region specific time trend and, finally, columns (4) and 
(8) use the full specification including control variables to minimize the possibility of omitted variable 
bias. 
Table 3. Panel estimation. 
 LPM - FE Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Women
 
-0.07*** 
(-4.78) 
-0.03** 
(-2.27) 
-0.03** 
(-2.16) 
-0.03* 
(-1.88) 
-3.59*** 
(-4.30) 
-2.20*** 
(-2.65) 
-2.66*** 
(-3.17) 
-2.66*** 
(-2.84) 
Constant 0.02*** 
(17.52) 
0.02*** 
(7.27) 
0.02*** 
(8.51) 
1.19 
(1.26) 
-3.25*** 
(-10.09) 
-3.40*** 
(-9.90) 
-3.46*** 
(-9.62) 
0.41 
(-0.69) 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Region time trend No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No No Yes No No No Yes 
AME     -0.087*** -0.051*** -0.059*** -0.058*** 
N. obs. 41420 41420 41270 35515 37709 37709 37709 33384 
Municipalities 1695 1695 1695 1642 1539 1539 1539 1488 
Notes. The dependent variable is the dummy y taking the value of 1 for municipalities put under commissioners every year from the 
appointment of the elected administration to the year of dissolution due to mafia infiltration, and 0 otherwise. t-test values and 
standardised normal z-test values are in parentheses, respectively, for LMP and probit model; robust standard errors cluster at the 
municipal level. Probit estimations contain provincial FE; in the LPM they have been dropped because of multicollinearity. AME: 
average marginal effect. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level). 
 
For LPM, we reject the null of the Hausman test; therefore we report only FE estimations. The 
available probit estimation for a binary dependent variable fits only random-effects models; we use 
the Chamberlain and Mundlak correction to fit the (pseudo) fixed-effects model.18 Every estimated 
equation has robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level. 
A first look at table 3 shows that the coefficient on Women is negative and highly significant 
everywhere, meaning that an increase in the share of women in the municipal political body decreases 
the probability of municipal dissolution for mafia infiltration. LPM estimates show a decrease in the 
coefficient of Women when we gradually strengthen the model from (1) to (4). More precisely, an 
increase in the share of women in a municipal body by 10 p.p. decreases the probability of dissolution 
by 0.7 p.p. in the most parsimonious specification and by 0.3 p.p. in the most complete one. Given 
that an improved specification should allow removing biases, this pattern is consistent with the 
                                                      
18
 We used the Stata command xtprobit for RE probit estimation. A random effects approach is valid if the regressors 
do not correlate with individual effects. If such a correlation exists, the estimated coefficients are biased. Therefore, we 
used Chamberlain’s random effects probit model (Chamberlain, 1982; Chamberlain, 1984; Mundlak, 1978). The 
Chamberlain and Mundlak correction prescribes the inclusion in the estimated equation of the mean terms, over the full 
time period, of regressors that should capture the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and the covariates that 
render the random effect model inconsistent. We also performed RE probit estimations that do not change the main results. 
They are available upon request. 
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presence of an upward bias in the most parsimonious specification. Consistently with the findings of 
the linear estimation, in the probit model we find a significant and negative association between the 
share of women on municipal councils and the probability of dissolution. To provide an easier 
interpretation of the coefficient of interest in the probit model, in table 3 we report the estimation of 
the AME. Because probit is a non-linear model, the investigated effect will differ from individual to 
individual; the AME computes the effect for each individual and then computes the average. In 
column (5), the average impact of a 10 p.p. increase of women on a council is a decrease in the 
probability of dissolution of 0.87 p.p. The relationship of interest is robust to the improvement of the 
model specification by including year FE, regional trend, and controls; the full specification in (8) 
reduces the AME: a rise of 10 p.p. in the share of women decreases the probability of dissolution by 
0.58 p.p. 
5.1 Endogeneity 
As said above, we addressed the endogeneity problem using the control function approach. Table 4 
shows the results of the estimations shown in Eq. (2) and (3) according to the different definitions of 
the dependent variable we use. In columns (1)–(3) the binary dependent variable is defined as in table 
3: it takes the value of 1 for municipalities put under commissioners every year from the appointment 
of the elected administration to the year of dissolution due to (presumed) mafia infiltration, and 0 
otherwise. Here, as in table 3, the presentation of estimations starts with the most parsimonious 
model; then, the specification is gradually strengthened. 
The definition of the dependent binary variable given above creates an asymmetry across 
municipalities. Moreover, it restricts mafia infiltration only to the dissolved administration. However, 
despite of the time of detection by the “Commissione Parlamentare Antimafia”, organized crime 
could have been infiltrated some time before. To take these features into account, we propose three 
further definitions of the dependent variable (see Daniele and Geys, 2015): 1) yi,t takes the value of 1 
in the year of commissioners and in the 4 years preceding the dissolution of the government, and 0 
otherwise; 2) yi,t takes the value of 1 in the year of commissioners and in the 9 years preceding the 
dissolution of the government, and 0 otherwise; 3) yi,t takes the value of 1 in the year of commissioners 
and in the entire period back to 1985, and 0 otherwise. The first definition completely removes the 
asymmetry across municipalities; the second one removes the asymmetry for municipalities put under 
commissioners starting from 1994; the third one maintains a sort of asymmetry and considers that the 
mafia infiltrated local government during the entire period, dating back to 1985. All three definitions 
still hypothesize a time-invariant effect for female participation in municipal administrations on mafia 
infiltration. According to these new operationalizations of the dependent variable, in columns (4)-(6) 
of table 4 we show the results of the full specification. 
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In the upper part of table 4 we show the results of the first (panel FE) stage estimation where the 
variable Women is regressed on the gender quota dummy. In all regressions, standard errors are 
clustered at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. 
In line with previous research (De Paola et al., 2010), the coefficient of GQ is positive and highly 
significant everywhere, meaning that municipalities whose council was elected when the gender 
quota law was in force have a higher share of women in charge. Table 4 shows a set of tests for the 
validity of instruments for all specifications. The F-test of weak identification assures that the power 
of the instrument is extremely high. The Kleibergen–Paap test of under-identification rejects the null 
hypothesis that the equation is under-identified. Finally, the Anderson–Rubin test for the significance 
of endogenous regressors in the structural equation rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients of 
the endogenous regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero and that the over-
identifying restrictions are also valid. Therefore, the tests presented do not show any sign of a weak 
instrument problem. 
The second stage estimation is a panel data probit with the Chamberlain and Mundlak correction. In 
all regressions, standard errors are calculated using the delta method.19 The first three columns of 
table 4 show strong evidence that the probability of dissolution of a municipality decreases when it 
has a larger share of women in its administration. When we progressively include controls, the 
magnitude of the estimated AME of Women decreases: an increase of 10 p.p. in the share of women 
reduces the probability of dissolution by 1.84 to 1.78 p.p. Results in (3) tells us that one standard 
deviation (0.091) increase in the share of women on the council lowers the probability of dissolution 
by 1.61 p.p. Finally, the variation in the mean of the share of women between dissolved and 
undissolved municipalities (respectively 0.091 and 0.109, as in table 1) decreases the probability of 
dissolution by 4.25p.p.20 
Applying the Rivers–Vuong test, we check the endogeneity of the variable of interest: the coefficient 
of the residuals (Res) are significantly different from zero (except in (1)), therefore IV estimation is 
the most appropriate one. 
Columns (4)–(6) differ in the definition of the dependent variable. Results show that when we 
hypothesize an organized crime infiltration in a municipality for a very long time (columns (5) and 
(6)), the average marginal effect for women’s presence in municipalities on mafia infiltration 
decreases compared to the baseline case: it could be harder for women to break long-lasting ties 
between the administration and mafia. 
                                                      
19
 We also perform estimations of specification (1), (2) and (3) where standard errors are calculated by the bootstrap 
method. The AME does not change. Results are not shown.  
20
 For Women = 0.091, Pr(y = 1|W = 0.091) =Φ (-8.22*0.091) = Φ(-0.75) = 0.2266. For Women = 0.109, Pr(y = 1|W = 
0.109) =Φ(-8.22*0.109) = Φ(-0.90) = 0.1841. Therefore, the variation in the probability is equal to 0.1841 - 0.2266 
= -0.0425.   
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Municipality controls are the log of municipal population size, the log of municipal unemployment 
rate, and the log of the young-to-old inhabitants’ ratio. Population size does not play a role in the 
probability of dissolution. The unemployment rate has a positive and significant sign meaning that an 
increase in unemployment increases the probability of mafia infiltration; the young-to-old inhabitants’ 
ratio has a significant and reverse effect. Moreover, given that Sicilia is one of the five Italian regions 
with special statutes,21 we control for this aspect with a dummy taking the value of 1 for municipalities 
belonging to Sicilia, and 0 otherwise. We run the full specification as in column 3 and the coefficient 
of interest does not change in sign, significance, and magnitude (the AME is equal to -0.178); the 
dummy for Sicilia is not significantly different from zero.22 
Table 4. IV estimations.  
Dep.Var. Women Panel FE - 1° stage regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GQ
 
0.04*** 
(19.5) 
0.07*** 
(30.4) 
0.07*** 
(31.1) 
0.07*** 
(32.05) 
0.07*** 
(32.05) 
0.07*** 
(32.1) 
Provincial FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region time trend No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. obs. 38641 38641 34524 38845 38845 38845 
F-test 379.9*** 926.1*** 969.3*** 1027.3*** 1027.3*** 1027.3*** 
Chi2 Kleibergen-Paap 300.5*** 926.7*** 970.1*** 1028.1*** 1028.1*** 1028.1*** 
Chi2 Anderson-Rubin Wald 
test 5.65
** 18.22*** 15.51*** 9.22*** 12.83*** 4.82** 
 
   
   
Dep.Var. y Probit - 2° stage estimation 
Women
 
-8.59*** 
(-2.34) 
-8.23*** 
(-3.49) 
-8.22*** 
(-3.41) 
-7.91*** 
(-3.80) 
-7.65*** 
(-4.36) 
-4.30*** 
(-3.17) 
Constant -3.07*** 
(-5.21) 
-2.71*** 
(-7.06) 
3.34 
(1.50) 
3.57 
(1.61) 
4.45* 
(1.02) 
0.68 
(0.61) 
Provincial FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region time trend No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AME -0.184** -0.181*** -0.178*** -0.185*** -0.166*** -0.059*** 
N. obs. 35081 35081 31292 31292 31292 30825 
Res 5.19 6.25*** 6.06*** 5.80*** 6.22*** 3.03** 
Notes. The dependent variable of the 1° stage estimation: Women. Columns (1)–(3): the dependent variable of the 2° stage is the dummy 
taking the value of 1 for municipalities put under commissioners every year from the appointment of the elected administration to the 
year of dissolution, due to mafia infiltration, and 0 otherwise. Column (4): the dependent variable of the 2° stage is the dummy taking 
the value of 1 in the year of commissioners and in the 4 years preceding the dissolution of the government, and 0 otherwise. Column 
(5): the dependent variable of the 2° stage is the dummy taking the value of 1 in the year of commissioners and in the 9 years preceding 
the dissolution of the government, and 0 otherwise. Column (6): the dependent variable of the 2° stage is the dummy taking the value 
of 1 in the year of commissioners and in the entire period back to 1985, and 0 otherwise. T-test values and standardised normal z-test 
values are in parentheses, respectively, for the first and second stage. Standard errors are calculated with the delta method, are clustered 
at the municipal level, and are robust to heteroscedasticity. AME: average marginal effect. Significant coefficients are indicated by * 
(10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level). 
 
One can argue that women in positions of power in their organizations might design and implement 
more stringent laws and policies against organized crime than men and, thus, could be perceived as 
strengthening the organization. This argument is particularly suitable for municipalities with female 
                                                      
21
 The Italian regions with special statutes enjoy particular forms and conditions of financial, administrative, and 
legislative autonomy.   
22
 Coefficients of control variables and the dummy for Sicilian are not shown in table 4. 
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mayors. In our sample, 3.36% of mayors are women; this percentage is equal to 3.4%, for undissolved 
municipalities and 1.7%, for dissolved municipalities. We estimated the effect of a female mayor on 
the probability of dissolution for mafia infiltration. In this case, our regressor of interest is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the mayor of a municipality is a woman, and 0 if it is a man (thereafter 
Mayor). Table 5 shows the results; columns (1) to (6) replicate the definitions of the dependent 
variable as the corresponding columns in table 4. 
These estimations corroborate previous results. A female mayor negatively affects the probability of 
dissolution. Results using the baseline definition of the dependent variable in the first three columns 
show an almost constant AME equal to -0.056. Thus, on average, municipalities led by female mayors 
are 5.6 p.p. less likely to be dissolved than are municipalities with male mayors. When considering 
other definitions of the dependent variable, in the first two cases the AME is higher and in the last 
one, as before, it is lower. 
Table 5. IV estimations.  
Dep.Var. Mayor Panel FE - 1° stage regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GQ
 
0.008* 
(1.62) 
0.01*** 
(3.43) 
0.01*** 
(3.35) 
0.01*** 
(3.35) 
0.01*** 
(3.35) 
0.01*** 
(3.35) 
Provincial FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region time trend No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. obs. 38585 38585 34464 34464 34464 34464 
F-test 2.63* 11.76*** 11.24*** 11.24*** 11.24*** 11.24*** 
Chi2 Kleibergen-Paap 2.63* 11.69*** 11.18*** 11.18*** 11.18*** 11.18*** 
Chi2 Anderson-Rubin Wald 
test 
6.27*** 19.32*** 16.30*** 18.66*** 19.37*** 14.63*** 
 
   
   
Dep.Var. y Probit - 2° stage estimation 
Mayor
 
-41.58** 
(-2.28) 
-32.15*** 
(-3.53) 
-33.81*** 
(-3.44) 
-33.61*** 
(-3.85) 
-33.79*** 
(-4.41) 
-18.02*** 
(-3.13) 
Constant -2.03*** 
(-2.77) 
-2.67*** 
(-7.71) 
3.07* 
(1.93) 
4.05** 
(2.00) 
5.04** 
(2.26) 
1.03 
(1.11) 
Provincial FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region time trend No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AME -0.056** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.059*** -0.069*** -0.041*** 
N. obs. 35037 35037 31244 31244 31244 30780 
Res 41.28** 31.94*** 33.67*** 33.52*** 33.25*** 17.94*** 
Notes. The dependent variable of the 1° stage estimation: Mayor. Columns (1)–(3): the dependent variable of the 2° stage is the dummy 
taking the value of 1 for municipalities put under commissioners every year from the appointment of the elected administration to the 
year of dissolution due to mafia infiltration, and 0 otherwise. Column (4): the dependent variable of the 2° stage is the dummy taking 
the value of 1 in the year of commissioners and in the 4 years preceding the dissolution of the government, and 0 otherwise. Column 
(5): the dependent variable of the 2° stage is the dummy taking the value of 1 in the year of commissioners and in the 9 years preceding 
the dissolution of the government, and 0 otherwise. Column (6): the dependent variable of the 2° stage is the dummy taking the value 
of 1 in the year of commissioners and in the entire period back to 1985, and 0 otherwise. T-test values and standardised normal z-test 
values are in parentheses, respectively, for the first and second stage. Standard errors are calculated with the delta method; are clustered 
at the municipal level and robust to heteroscedasticity. AME: average marginal effect. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% 
level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level). 
 
In the first-stage estimations, the instrument is positive and significantly different from zero and first-
stage tests confirm the power of the instrument. The municipalities’ controls are the same as before. 
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5.2 Effect of gender quota reform 
In light of our findings, the investigation of policies promoting female participation in politics should 
be of great interest. In particular, the scenario in the analysis advocates the investigation of the effect 
of gender quota reform that interested Italian municipalities during the period under consideration. 
The difficulty of measuring organized crime infiltration is well known; the proxy we used makes 
unsuitable a direct evaluation of the impact that the introduction of the gender quota at municipal 
elections in 1993 has had on the penetration of organized crime in city councils. Indeed, the sub-
sample of municipalities that were dissolved due to mafia infiltration but did not vote under the gender 
quota law is not sizable. This small number of observations does not allow implementation of a 
credible diff-in-diff methodology. However, results of our analysis allow this very interesting 
investigation by exploiting some findings from the De Paola et al. (2010) study. 
As shown in figure 3, starting with gender quota institutional reform (in 1993), an increasing trend in 
the share of women in political bodies of all municipalities has emerged, partially due to the 
introduction of the gender quota law (De Paola et al., 2010). First, we can evaluate, according to the 
estimated coefficients in column (3) table 4, the effect of this increasing trend in the share of women 
on the probability of interest. Indeed, the growth in the share of women in municipal bodies between 
1992 and 2013 (in mean over all municipalities) decreases the probability of dissolution for mafia 
infiltration by 28.3 p.p.23 However, this sizable result includes not only the effect due to gender quota 
reform but also other confounding factors related to temporal trends. To disentangle the impact of the 
reform, we rely on the De Paola et al. (2010) paper. They show that the fraction of women elected in 
municipalities directly affected by the gender quota law increased by around 2 p.p. more than in 
municipalities not affected by the reform;24 thereby, increasing the share of women in 1992 by 2 p.p., 
we calculate that the introduction of the gender quota reduced the probability of dissolution of 5.9 
p.p.25 
Secondly, we can do the same exercise according to the findings of column (3) table 5. We evaluate 
the effect of the increase in the elected female mayors due to the gender quota reform. De Paola et al. 
(2010) estimated that the gender quota reform grew the probability of electing a female mayor by 
3.1p.p. As before, starting from the share of female mayors in our sample at 1992 (0.0126) and 
increasing it by 3.1 p.p., we calculate that the effect on the probability of dissolution is of -26.64 p.p. 
                                                      
23
 The mean of the share of women in 1992 is 0.038; that in 2013 is 0.16. For Women = 0.038, Pr(y = 1|W = 0.038) =Φ(-
8.22*0.038) =Φ(-0.31) = 0.3783. For Women = 0.16, Pr(y = 1|W = 0.16) =Φ(-8.22*0.16) = Φ(-1.31) = 0.0951. Therefore, 
the variation in the probability is equal to 0.0951 - 0.3783 = -0.283. 
24
 De Paola et al. (2010) considered all Italian municipalities in their analysis but they showed no difference in the effect 
of the gender quota reform in the north and south of Italy.    
25
 We increase the share of women in 1992 by 2 p.p. and make the same calculation as before: Pr(y = 1|W = 0.038) - Pr(y 
= 1|W = 0.058). 
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Therefore, the effect of the gender quota reform, through its push toward a greater presence of women 
in municipal bodies, has strengthened local government against organized crime infiltration. The 
more sizable result relies on the increase in the number of female mayors with respect to the increase 
in the share of women on municipal councils; this result is probably due to the notion that a female 
mayor might exercise a stronger deterrence effect against organized crime infiltration by being the 
leader of the local administration. These findings corroborate the idea that introducing affirmative 
measures aimed at reducing women’s underrepresentation in politics (as gender quotas) may promote 
further positive results from human/socio/economic perspectives linked to crime. 
6 Discussion and Robustness checks 
This analysis has provided evidence that female presence in local politics is more likely to link to 
fewer municipal dismissals for mafia infiltration. We now consider several possible explanations of 
this result. A natural argument links to the “nature” of women: they discourage organized crime 
infiltration because of their higher sense of morality, which translates into an improvement in the 
quality of institutions. Because women are more likely to exhibit “helping” behaviours (Eagly and 
Crowley, 1986), score more highly on “integrity tests” (Ones and Viswesvaran, 1998), and tend to 
vote according to social issues (Goertzel, 1983), a higher representation of women leads to the 
adoption of policies and practices that have a positive impact on the quality of institutions, 
organisations, and society as a whole; in this sense, women may be seen as an institutional 
strengthening and strengthened institutions make it difficult for the mafia to infiltrate. Another related 
argument concerns a positive externality exercised by women: they could positively influence their 
male colleagues by restraining, disciplining, and elevating the latter’s behaviour. 
A stronger argument for our results is that women in positions of power in their organizations, as 
mayors in local administrations, may design and implement more stringent laws and policies against 
organized crime than men. This explanation is in line with what the Italian system prescribes. That 
is, the system gives the mayor the greatest part of decision-making and executive power. Therefore, 
it is not difficult to believe in the effectiveness of measures discouraging criminal activities 
implemented by female mayors. However, our general result, showing the negative impact of 
increasing female participation in politics on organized crime infiltration, holds even when we restrict 
the sample only to municipalities led by a male mayor: this ensures that the influence of women in 
the political body on crime infiltration is not driven by the stronger effect of a female mayor. 
Therefore, recalling that councillors have important responsibilities over a wide range of city 
activities (e.g. urban life, roads, gardens, the environment, pollution, traffic conditions, local 
production, local services, cultural activities), women, as municipal councillors, could exercise a 
function of pressure and guidance toward certain “fair” policies, mostly if female councillors 
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represent a local government majority. Moreover, our data show that the mean of the share of women 
in municipalities led by a female mayor is twice the mean of the share of women in municipalities 
led by a male mayor (respectively 0.175 and 0.092); taking the results of Baskaran and Hessami 
(2018), electing a female mayor can have spill-over effects for the likelihood of having women on 
municipal councils and, thus, can be seen as a further way to increase female participation in politics. 
One more reason for our results links to the differences in risk attitudes between genders; evidence 
indicates that women are less likely than men to engage in risky behaviours such as illicit drug use 
and criminal activities (Cooperstock and Parnell, 1982; Daly and Wilson, 1988; Gottfredson and 
Hirschi, 1990; Kandel and Logan, 1984; and Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985). 
In addition, numerous recent studies concerning the policy implications of gender representation in 
local government find that women tend to allocate a greater budget share to education and childcare 
(Svaleryd, 2009), health care (Rehavi, 2007), and environmental sustainability (Funk and Gathmann, 
2010). As the literature on corruption suggests (Mauro, 1998; Baraldi, 2008; Delavallade, 2006; 
Cordis, 2014), these kinds of public expenses cannot guarantee huge economic gains if managed 
under the influence of organized crime, rather than by public works, urban plans, etc. Therefore, 
where the share of women in local government increases, a higher pressure exists to devolve public 
resources toward these sectors (education, health, etc.), where it is less profitable for organised crime 
to infiltrate. 
In the following section we provide further evidence for qualifying and supporting our results. 
6.1 Impact on dissolutions unrelated to (suspected) mafia infiltration 
An important issue concerns the interpretation of results linked to our measure of organized crime 
infiltration in city government, that is, dissolution due to mafia infiltration. City councils can also be 
dismissed for reasons unrelated to mafia infiltration. Reasons for dismissals include resignation by 
elected officials (resignation of the mayor/resignation of more than 50% of council members), failure 
to organize elections, special cases of ineligibility of the mayor, failure to pass the annual budget, 
political crisis in ruling coalitions. Such dissolutions are fairly common26 and lots of municipalities 
witness at least one dissolution of their local government unrelated to mafia infiltration. 27 
Independent of their effects on mafia infiltration, it might be possible that women on city councils 
have a negative impact on dissolution per se, as well as on dissolution due to mafia infiltration. If this 
is the case, our results could be led by confounding factors other than the “virtues” of women that, 
by strengthening institutions, discourage organized crime. Therefore, we checked this aspect by 
                                                      
26
 During the period 1990–2013, city councils dismissed for reasons unrelated to mafia infiltration were 47% of the entire 
sample. The most common reason was resignation by elected officials. 
27
 We do not distinguish between different reasons for government dissolution; thus, we treat all non-mafia dissolutions 
as one group. 
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performing regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 in the year of 
local government’s dissolution for reasons unrelated to mafia infiltration, and 0 otherwise. Results 
appear in table 6. In the first three columns the regressor of interest is the share of women on 
municipal councils whereas in the last three columns the regressor of interest is the dummy variable 
for the gender of the mayor. We present findings from several estimation strategies that control for 
regional trends and municipality controls. We show only the second stage; all the performed tests on 
the validity of the instrument (not shown) confirm no signal of weakness of the instrumental variable. 
Table 6. Second stage IV estimations. 
 Probit IV - 2° stage estimation 
Dep.Var. y (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Women 9.77** 
(12.26) 
5.61** 
(11.28) 
5.11*** 
(10.53) 
   
Mayor 
   
56.19*** 
(12.52) 
22.53*** 
(11.27) 
21.50*** 
(10.58) 
Constant -3.89*** 
(-11.89) 
-3.17*** 
(-10.09) 
-6.15*** 
(-10.46) 
-5.21*** 
(-14.48) 
-3.44*** 
(-10.98) 
-6.75*** 
(-11.93) 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region time trend No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Municipality controls No No Yes No No Yes 
N. obs. 27449 27449 24728 27434 27434 24713 
Res -8.66*** -4.25*** -3.67*** -56.15*** -22.47*** -21.43*** 
Notes. The dependent variable of the 1° stage estimation in (1)-(3): Women. The dependent variable of the 1° stage estimation in (4)–
(6): Mayor. In the first stage estimations we run the F-test, the Kleibergen–Paap test and the Anderson–Rubin test. The dependent 
variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 in the year of local government’s dissolution for reasons unrelated to mafia infiltration, and 
0 otherwise. Normal z-test values are in parentheses; robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. Significant coefficients 
are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and *** (1% level). 
 
Different from previous results, the share of women on city councils as well as female mayors have 
positive and significant effects on local government dissolutions due to factors unrelated to mafia 
infiltration. This result is in line with that of Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012) and supports the 
interpretation of our findings. 
6.2 Sample restriction 
We undertook further robustness checks of our findings by restricting the sample to more 
homogeneous municipalities to control for other factors that might confound the impact of the share 
of women on the probability of municipalities’ dissolution due to mafia infiltration. First, we restrict 
the undissolved group of municipalities to those one in the neighbourhoods of municipalities included 
in the dissolved group. To do that, we take the data by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) on 
neighbouring municipalities 28  and, for each dissolved municipality, we take its neighbouring 
municipalities. We construct a new dataset made of 580 municipalities observed in the period 1985–
2013. In columns (1) and (4) of table 7 we carry out the complete specifications of our model on this 
restricted sample where the regressors of interest are, respectively, Women and Mayor. The 
coefficient of the female share in municipal bodies is significant and the sign remains negative; the 
                                                      
28
 ISTAT, “Matrici di contiguità”, https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/137333. 
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impact on the probability of dissolution for mafia infiltration is more than 3 times greater than in the 
full sample (shown by the AME). Instead, for female mayors, the AME increases, but less than double. 
Therefore, the magnitude of results was driven by comparing groups of municipalities that are more 
or less heterogeneous. 
Table 7. Second stage IV estimations.  
 Probit IV - 2° stage estimation 
 Neighbourhood Excluding Puglia Population<15000 Neighbourhood 
Excluding 
Puglia Population<15000 
Dep.Var. y (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Women -9.15** 
(-3.34) 
-7.99*** 
(-3.29) 
-5.32** 
(-1.98) 
   
Mayor 
   
-28.94*** 
(-3.37) 
-32.44*** 
(-3.35) 
-28.70** 
(-2.05) 
Constant 3.34 
(1.64) 
3.84* 
(1.21) 
3.58 
(1.34) 
1.01 
(0.63) 
1.42 
(1.21) 
1.73 
(0.77) 
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AME -0.596*** -0.187*** -0.102** -0.083*** -0.054*** -0.052*** 
N. obs. 10658 28203 23575 10583 28162 23540 
Res 6.94** 5.84** 2.93 28.82*** 32.30*** 27.94** 
Notes. The dependent variable of the 1° stage estimation in (1)–(3): Women. The dependent variable of the 1° stage estimation in (4)–
(6): Mayor. The dependent variable yi,t takes the value of 1 for municipalities put under commissioners every year from the appointment 
of the elected administration to the year of dissolution due to mafia infiltration, and 0 otherwise. In columns (1)-(3) the regressor of 
interest is Women whereas in columns (4)-(6) it is Mayor. Standardized normal z-test values are in parentheses; robust standard errors 
clustered at municipal level. AME: average marginal effect. Significant coefficients are indicated by * (10% level), ** (5% level) and 
*** (1% level). 
 
In analysing a more homogeneous sample of municipalities, figure 2 suggests to exclude Puglia from 
the sample because of its very low number of municipalities in compulsory administration and the 
high number of undissolved municipalities. Columns (2) and (5) of table 7 show that the estimation 
results are in line with those of the baseline analysis in sign and magnitude of the AME. 
A further robustness check focused on the threshold of population. According to law no. 164/1991 
and decree no. 267/2000, to compute the share of women (Women), we considered all the local 
administrators: the mayors, municipal council members and members of municipal executive 
councils. However, they form the elective local political body only in municipalities under 15,000 
inhabitants; in municipalities above 15,000 inhabitants, the elective body only comprises the mayor 
and municipal council members. Moreover, only the municipal council is the elective body affected 
by the gender quota law of 1993. Indeed, no gender restrictions exist on the mayor and on the 
municipal executive council that is appointed directly by the mayor. However, for municipalities 
under 15,000 inhabitants, the municipal executive body is appointed by the mayor among the 
members of the municipal council; thus, the gender quota law affects the entire political body. 
Therefore, we restrict the sample to municipalities whose population is below 15,000 inhabitants. In 
this way the sample perfectly fits the requirements of the gender quota and municipal dissolution laws 
we exploit. We expect no relevant changes in the results for two reasons: 1) municipalities below 
15,000 inhabitants comprise almost 85% of the entire sample; 2) the size of the municipal executive 
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is very small, with low variability in the share of women in that office. Columns (3) and (6) show 
estimation results. The significant negative impact of the presence of women in the political body and 
of a female mayor on mafia infiltration is confirmed. Although the AME of Mayor replicates the main 
analysis, the estimated AME of the share of women is lower. This may be due to the different gender 
thresholds stated by law no. 81/1993. Indeed, the law prescribes a different threshold for gender 
quotas according to the size of municipalities. For municipalities above 15,000 inhabitants the 
threshold for a gender presence in an electoral list is 2/3, whereas in municipalities below 15,000, this 
threshold is 3/4. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that this different prescription led to different 
electoral outcomes in female presence in local political bodies; precisely, the threshold of 2/3 
presumably led to a greater share of woman in the political body than the threshold of 3/4. Therefore, 
higher gender thresholds may imply greater advocacy for female presence in politics and, 
consequently, greater indirect effects in deterring organized crime infiltration. 
6.3 Falsification test for the validity of the instrument 
As a falsification test to check the validity of the gender quota law as an instrumental variable, we 
randomise the share of women appointed to the council in two ways: (i) we randomly assign 
observations on the share of women across the whole sample; (ii) we randomise the share of women 
appointed to the council in every municipality across years. Running the first stage of the full 
specification of the model, in both cases we find the gender quota is no longer significant; also, the 
F-test provides weak identification results (respectively, Prob > F = 0.8133 and Prob > F = 0.9820). 
This suggests we identified the right source of variability to explain changes in women’s 
representation in local government. 
7 Concluding remarks 
In contributing to the still open debate about whether gender matters in policymaking, this paper 
offers a further motivation in favour of policies devoted to reduce the underrepresentation of women 
in politics at national and local levels, going beyond equality reasons. In recent years, a large number 
of countries introduced measures aimed at increasing the share of women in governments to 
legitimate democracy and stimulate voters to believe in female potential in politics. These measures, 
such as gender quotas, may be seen as institution-strengthening in light of the results of our research. 
Indeed, this work provides new and unexplored evidence of the effect of politician’s gender on mafia 
infiltration. Given that the literature on organized crime ascribes its proliferation to the weakness of 
institutions, we showed that women, by improving institutions, can deter organized crime infiltration; 
thus, policies increasing female participation in political life also can be seen as enhancing public 
organization. 
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In the baseline analysis, we perform several estimations on about 1,700 southern Italian municipalities 
relating the probability of dissolution for mafia infiltration to the share of women in political body. 
We rely on two Italian laws; one, law no. 164/1991, allows us to measure mafia infiltration in Italian 
municipalities; second, law no. 81/1993 allows us to correct for endogeneity bias by creating an 
exogenous source of variation in the share of women in the municipal political body. We find that a 
10 p.p. increase in the share of women decreases the probability of municipal dissolution by about 
1.8 p.p. Results are confirmed when we consider the gender of the mayor: when the mayor is female, 
the probability of dissolution decreases of about 5 p.p. compared to a male mayor. This result holds 
over different estimation techniques and improvement in the specification of the model. It is also 
robust to the further definitions of the binary dependent variable and sample restrictions. 
But, how do women reduce organized crime infiltration by being in politics? Here we propose 
possible explanations that advocate future research. The principle underlying gender studies is that 
women have different perspectives and preferences from those of men. Therefore, women in 
government implement new sets of views in decision-making and, consequently, affect policies, 
organizations, and institutions in the provision of good and services, pressures in committee, guidance 
in legislative activities, levels of corruption, and political participation (Dollar et al., 2001; Michelle 
Heath et al.; 2005; Lawless, 2004; Wängnerud, 2009). Although the number of female politicians is 
still small, a considerable increase in female representation at local and national elections is taking 
place worldwide. This evidence may reflect the awareness that participation in politics is more 
attainable for women and is desirable, also supported by our results. Thus, this analysis offers 
additional reasons to implement policies aimed at reducing women’s underrepresentation in political 
life in that such policies may have a very large range of socio-economic benefits. 
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